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Unincorporated associations and tort liability 
Myles McGregor-Lowndes and Rhonda Richards 
 
This article examines recent authorities both in Australia and the United Kingdom that consider tort 
liability issues involving unincorporated associations, their members and officers. The general principle 
is that a member of a member’s club owes no duty to the other members other than that of an ordinary 
individual in the absence of any club rule to the contrary. First the liability of a member of an 
unincorporated association is examined, followed by that of the committee members as a whole and then 
individual officers. Finally, the duty owed to a volunteer in the course of an unincorporated 
association’s activities is discussed. 
 
Introduction 
There are approximately 700,000 non-profit organisations in Australia, of which about 320,000 are 
incorporated as companies, incorporated associations, under letters patent or by special statutory 
provisions.1 Although since the 1980s there has been a considerable transfer of unincorporated 
associations2 to incorporated associations, there still remain a large number of unincorporated non-profit 
bodies. This shift to corporate status through incorporated association legislation is largely due to 
problems connected with unincorporated non-profit associations’ failure to enjoy a distinct legal identity 
independent of their members. 
 A recent case, Hrybynyuk v Mazur [2004] NSWCA 374, highlights the difficulties inherent in 
unincorporated associations. While helping with demolition of a shed at the Russian Club, of which he 
was a member, Mr Hrybynyuk was seriously injured when he fell through the roof. Since the Russian 
Club was an unincorporated association and could not be sued in its own right, Hrybynyuk proceeded 
against its president, Mr Mazur. The negligence action was brought on the basis that, since Mazur had 
requested Hrybynyuk’s help with the demolition, he owed a duty of care to Hrybynyuk with respect to 
this task. Although at first instance3 a duty of care was found to exist, no breach of the duty was evident. 
 On appeal, two main issues relating to unincorporated associations were deliberated. 
 First, the New South Wales Court of Appeal examined whether members of these associations owe 
a duty of care to one another. Next, the matter of whether these members owe a duty of care to 
volunteers was considered. After a detailed analysis of these issues, it was evident that committee 
members and office bearers were still more likely than ordinary members to be held liable in negligence 
and that this liability also extends to volunteers. 
 This article examines recent authorities both in Australia and the United Kingdom that consider tort 
liability issues involving unincorporated associations. Fletcher notes in his seminal work on 
unincorporated associations that this area of law is blighted by “the limitations of the primary material 
and secondary comment”4 with only a few lower court decisions that are largely influenced by particular 
situations rather than broad policy. First the liability of a member is examined, then that of the 
committee members as a whole, then individual officers. Finally, the duty owed to a volunteer in the 
course of an unincorporated association’s activities is discussed. 
 
Members’ liability in an unincorporated association 
Viewing liability in negligence within an unincorporated association from a broad perspective involves 
consideration of the position of the ordinary members. The general principle is that, if the only 
connection among people is their membership of an unincorporated association, then no duty of care is 
owed solely on that basis. Pritchard J in Prole v Allen [1950] 1 All ER 476 at 477, commenting on Mrs 
Prole’s fall down a set of unlit steps at an unincorporated members’ club stated: 
<blockquote> 
 
1 Lyons M, Third Sector: The contribution of nonprofit cooperative enterprises in Australia (Allen & Unwin, 2001) p 21. 
2 This article adopts the definition of an unincorporated non-profit association from Fletcher K, The Law Relating to Non-Profit 
Associations in Australia and New Zealand (The Law Book Company Limited, 1986) p 34: “A group of persons freely associating 
for any lawful objects or purposes except making pecuniary gains for themselves or their group.” 
3 Hrybynyuk v Mazur (unreported, {AQ-New South Wales District Court, Walmsley DCJ DC 3380/02). 
4 Fletcher, n 2, p 133. 
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The defence – that the defendants owed no duty to the plaintiff – is well-founded in so far as it is raised on behalf of 
the defendants, Allen, Short and Norman. They were members of the club as was the plaintiff and, as such, they 
owed her no duties.</blockquote> 
 This stance was reiterated by the Court of Appeal in Robertson v Ridley, an English case concerning 
liability for a motorcycle accident on the premises of an unincorporated members’ club. May LJ (at 
874), referring to the decision in the lower court, stated: “In so far as the judge held that in general there 
is no liability at common law on a club or its members on the one hand to individual members on the 
other hand, I respectfully agree.” Later, Woolf LJ stated (at 877): <blockquote> 
Prima facie the liability of a member of a members’ club depends on the rules of the club. In the absence of any 
provision in the rules or any action by an individual member, one member owes no duty to the other members of the 
club for the state of the club’s premises.</blockquote> 
This comment seems particularly pertinent to the situation outlined in Hrybynyuk v Mazur where Mazur 
was responsible for the demolition work being carried out on site at the Russian Club.  
 Thomson v Douglas Amateur Football Club Social Club [1999] ScotSC 19 is another case 
involving a serious accident as a result of a member’s voluntary participation in an attempt to replace 
the roof of an unincorporated association’s premises. It differs from Hrybynyuk v Mazur in that the 
volunteer, Leonard Wallace, was responsible for the accident, rather than its victim. In addressing the 
liability issue, Sheriff Davidson cited with approval para 814 of the second volume of the Stair 
Memorial Encyclopaedia which describes the laws of Scotland relating to members’ clubs. The 
paragraph states: 
<blockquote> 
An association or club is not vicariously liable to one of its members for injury to that member due to the delict of 
another member or servant even when committed while acting in the interests of the association or within the scope 
of his employment.</blockquote> 
 This principle was reiterated in Kenneth Harrison v West of Scotland Kart Club [2004] ScotCS 80, 
a matter involving a go-kart accident at a track operated by the unincorporated West of Scotland Kart 
Club. At [25], the Lord President of the First Division of the Inner House of the Court of Session 
asserted:<blockquote> 
There is simply no place within the structure of an unincorporated association for the operation, as between the 
members themselves, of the principle of vicarious liability … The only delictual liabilities which can arise between 
members of an unincorporated body are such as arise directly from their personal actings as 
individuals.</blockquote> 
 More recently, in the Scottish Court of Sessions, Lady Paton noted in a case of abuse involving the 
De La Salle order, AM v Hendron [2005] ScotCS CSOH 121 at [91]:<blockquote> 
As the law stands at present, a member of a club or an unincorporated association cannot recover damages from the 
association in respect of injuries suffered by him ex delicto at the hands of another member of the 
association.</blockquote> 
Such concern about an unincorporated association’s lack of legal standing prompted the Scottish Law 
Commission in its Seventh Program of Law Reform, initiated in January 2005, to investigate the New 
Zealand5 and Australian6 models of incorporation as an alternative means of administering such 
associations and addressing their fundamental problems including the question of whom to sue in tort. 
Committee members’ legal responsibility for an unincorporated association 
Given that Mazur was a committee member of the Russian Club, it is useful to examine the practice of 
suing committee members with a view to evaluating their liability in negligence. The issue of committee 
members’ liability was addressed in Prole v Allen [1950] 1 All ER 476 where the whole committee was 
sued. Although Pritchard J found that membership of a committee per se did not enhance the liability of 
one club member to another, he stated that one particular committee member, by virtue of his position as 
the steward of the club, could not escape a finding of negligence against him. The judge’s reasoning (at 
477-478) was that:<blockquote> 
He was appointed by all the members, operating through the committee, and, in my judgment, he thereupon became 
the agent of each member to do reasonably carefully all those things which he was appointed to do and in that way 
he came to owe a duty to each of the members to take reasonable care and to carry out his duties without 
negligence.</blockquote> 
 An Australian case which dealt with committee members’ liability both in contract and tort was 
Smith v Yarnold [1969] 2 NSWR 410. The tort claim involved injury to a spectator due to the collapse of 
 
5 Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ). 
6 Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT); Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW); Associations Incorporation Act (NT); 
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld); Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA); Associations Incorporation Act 1964 
(Tas); Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic); Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA). 
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a grandstand at a racing day organised by the Taree Greyhound Racing Club. Since this club was an 
unincorporated association, the injured spectator, who had paid an admission fee, proceeded against the 
members of the committee as well as the club’s paid secretary on the grounds that they were the 
occupiers of the premises onto which he was an invitee. Initially, he was successful against both the 
committee members and the secretary in his claim that they had breached their duty of care with respect 
to the unsafe nature of the grandstand. On appeal, as a paid official and non-member of the Taree 
Greyhound Racing Club, the secretary was absolved from any liability, but the finding of liability 
against the members of the committee was upheld.  
 Much of the discussion in the New South Wales Court of Appeal focused on whether the 
appropriate people had been sued. Herron CJ maintained that: “There was evidence to render the 
appellants liable under both counts”, despite the contention of the committee members that the entire 
membership of the Taree Greyhound Racing Club should have been joined as defendants.7 He 
continued:<blockquote> 
A claim in tort is not defeated because all tortfeasors are not sued. Even though the appellants were sued as 
committee members, they were persons liable and the additional averment of the capacity in which they acted does 
not render untenable the respondent’s claim against them as members of the club.8</blockquote> 
In a final endeavour to justify his stance, he asserted:<blockquote> 
The liability of the committee men of the Greyhound Racing Club does not depend wholly upon a logical approach 
to the law of contract or of tort, none the less it is the only method by which justice can be done towards the 
plaintiff who paid his admission fee and was entitled to expect the security which the invitation 
involved.9</blockquote> 
 A cautionary note was sounded by Jacobs JA who declared that, despite arriving at a similar 
conclusion to Herron CJ, “I do not wish it to appear that I accept the argument that all the members of 
the club were shown to be either the contracting parties or the occupiers or could have been made 
parties”.10 Sievers takes up this matter as regards tort law, commenting that the case failed to decide: 
“The underlying issue of whether the occupiers of the property were the members of the committee or 
the whole body of members at the relevant time.”11
 Some support for Herron CJ’s viewpoint was forthcoming in the later case of the City of Gosnells v 
Roberts (1994) 12 WAR 437; (1994) 85 LGERA 214; [1994] ATR 61-846, a negligence action focusing 
on the damage caused to the defendants when their motorcycle collided with a horse that had escaped 
from agistment in the grounds of the unincorporated Gosnells Polocrosse Club during the “off season”. 
In the Full Court of the Western Australian Supreme Court, Pidgeon J (at 443) argued that the views of 
Herron CJ had merit in that, “If committee members were not liable then the person injured by such 
negligence may well be without a remedy”. Nevertheless, he solved the problem here by ascribing 
liability to the owner of the horse. Rowland J too suggested at 445 that, “Committee members could, in 
certain circumstances, be primarily responsible in tort in accordance with the policy enunciated by 
Herron CJ”. However, in this particular situation, because there was no evidence of the usual, 
“collegiate” activity of members, he could: “See nothing in logic, or policy, or law, which would impose 
any contractual or tortious obligation on the other members, or those whom the members had elected to 
act on behalf of the members.”12
 A contrary approach was taken by Keeler in a contemporary critique of the judgment.13 He shared 
the original trial judge’s opinion that liability should attach to the members of the committee at the time 
of the accident. Parodying the quote from Rowland J he averred, <blockquote> 
There is little merit in logic, policy or law in a result which holds that a group which has occupied and used land for 
nearly 10 years is immune from any duty of care to people injured by activities carried on upon it to their 
knowledge because of the informality of their private arrangements. The law should, like the trial judge, be 
concerned that engaging in informal cooperative activity does not confer legal immunities on those who engage in it 
and allow practical irresponsibility towards outsiders.14</blockquote> 
 
 
7 Smith v Yarnold [1969] 2 NSWR 410 at 414. 
8 Smith v Yarnold [1969] 2 NSWR 410 at 414. 
9 Smith v Yarnold [1969] 2 NSWR 410 at 415. 
10 Smith v Yarnold [1969] 2 NSWR 410 at 416. 
11 Sievers AS, Associations and Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand (2nd ed, The Federation Press, 1996) p36. 
12 City of Gosnells v Roberts (1994) 12 WAR 437 at 445. 
13 Keeler “John Case Notes City of Gosnells v Roberts: Coping with Unincorporated Associations” ‘City of Gosnells v Roberts : 
coping with unincorporated associations’}(1995) 3 TLJ 7. 
14 Keeler, n 13 at 13-14. 
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The liability of an unincorporated association’s office bearers 
If the decision in Smith v Yarnold [1969] 2 NSWR 410 implied that the members of the committee were 
personally liable in tort, the English judgment in Robertson v Ridley declined to follow suit with respect 
to office bearers. May LJ (at 874) determined that the stipulation in the club’s rules that the chairman 
and secretary “were responsible in law for the conduct of the club as a corporate body”, did not operate 
to extend the office bearers’ liability beyond that already imposed by common law. Certainly, no 
interpretation of the relevant rules suggested these office bearers were liable in tort for negligence. The 
following assertion was made at 876: <blockquote> 
Merely to say that the secretary and the chairman shall be responsible in law for the conduct of the club, cannot lay 
any duty of care to the plaintiff on either the chairman or the secretary in respect of the state of this 
roadway.</blockquote> 
 Mixed messages were given in the Australian decisions relating to the Gosnells Polocrosse Club in 
which the office bearers were sued along with the City of Gosnells. At first instance in Roberts v City of 
Gosnells 13 SR (WA) 72,  Keall J held both the office bearers at the time of the collision as well as the 
current office bearers liable in negligence, although the latter’s financial contribution was limited to the 
amount of the club’s assets. Following an appeal from Mr Dixey and Mrs Duncan, who were president 
and secretary respectively when the accident occurred, both judgments were set aside. Pidgeon J in City 
of Gosnells v Roberts (1994) 12 WAR 437 at 444 attributed liability to the horse’s owner rather than the 
office bearers since he regarded the horse’s agistment as a member’s decision not a club activity. 
Anderson J (at 450) stated <blockquote> 
In my opinion liability cannot be fixed upon either Mrs Duncan or Mr Dixey by recourse to doctrines relating to 
unincorporated associations; and there is no other basis on which either of them can be held liable for the 
respondents’ injuries.</blockquote> 
 This approach, also adopted by Badgery-Parker J, was cited by the Court in Hyde v Agar; Worsley v 
Australian Rugby Football Union Ltd (1998) 45 NSWLR 487; (1999) ATR 81-495. In an attempt to 
obtain damages for serious injuries sustained on the rugby field, Mr Hyde and Mr Worsley, both 
hookers, sought to sue the International Rugby Football Board (IRFB), an unincorporated association, 
for its failure to provide rules to protect hookers from the injuries they had suffered. Badgery-Parker J 
(at 497) was quoted as commenting, when dismissing an earlier appeal by Mr Hyde, that the IRFB was 
not a “proper defendant” since it possessed no true legal identity. “The alternative”, in his opinion, “was 
to fix liability upon those members of the association who held office or constituted the association’s 
board of management”. The Members of the Board whose involvement pre-dated 1987 were those most 
likely to be held responsible for the deficiencies in the laws governing rugby union, but he stressed that 
they must be sued individually. 
 Gleeson CJ summed up the farcical result of this strategy in the High Court in Agar v Hyde; Agar v 
Worsley (2000) 201 CLR 552; (2000) 74 ALJR 1219; (2000) ATR 81-569. He asserted (at 
669):<blockquote> 
No individual appellant could amend the rules. No individual appellant controlled the game internationally. No 
individual appellant was a law-giver … To speak of persons who were sent once a year to London, as 
representatives of national unions, as controlling a game of football played in a Sydney suburb, or a country town, 
by reason of their collective capacity to alter the international rules, is to speak of a remote form of 
control.</blockquote> 
 A similar outcome ensued in a later Scottish case, Harrison v West of Scotland Kart Club [2000] 
ScotCS 284. When a driver was seriously injured during a test-drive of a go-kart at Summerlee 
Raceway, he sued both the unincorporated West of Scotland Kart Club and certain named office-bearers 
as its representatives and as individuals. He claimed that, in the absence of a recognised safety 
committee, the five office-bearers were jointly responsible for decisions concerning track 
safety.15<blockquote> 
Their experience in kart racing combined with their knowledge of the actual physical design of the Raceway, 
including the positioning of buildings and crash barriers, as well as their familiarity with a previous accident had 
made them aware that unless crash protection was installed near a particular building, “There was a danger that 
another driver might similarly lose control of his vehicle in the vicinity of the building, might collide with the 
building, and as a result suffer serious injury, as in fact happened.16</blockquote> 
 Lady Paton, after consideration of several of the previously mentioned cases, reiterated that no duty 
of care attached to the office bearers per se: “Rather it is their knowledge as outlined above coupled 
with their de facto assumption of the responsibility for taking executive decisions with respect to track 
safety”,17 which fixed them with the duty of care. However, in dismissing the action against the five 
 
15 Harrison v West of Scotland Kart Club [2000] ScotCS 284 at [2]. 
16 Harrison v West of Scotland Kart Club [2000] ScotCS 284 at [28]. 
17 Harrison v West of Scotland Kart Club [2000] ScotCS 284 at [29]. 
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office-bearers as the designated representatives of the West of Scotland Kart Club, she 
concluded:<blockquote> 
I shall allow the action to proceed so far as directed against the five persons as individuals. This result may seem to 
place a heavy burden upon those who undertake duties in the context of a club or voluntary association. However, 
where individuals accept responsibilities in respect of matters affecting the safety of others, certain consequences 
may inevitably follow, and it may be necessary for such individuals to make appropriate arrangements for insurance 
or indemnity.18</blockquote> 
 In the context of Hrybynyuk v Mazur, Hrybynyuk’s concerns reflected the views voiced by Lady 
Paton. His action against Mazur centred not on establishing that Mazur owed him a duty of care in his 
role as the president of the Russian Club, but rather that such a duty came about because of Mazur’s 
responsibility for the demolition of the sheds. At [16] in the judgment, Beazley J, with whom Sheller 
and Ipp JJ agreed, posed the question: “Was there something in the circumstances that made Mr Mazur 
liable beyond his membership of the Club?” 
 In reaching the conclusion that there was something that made Mazur liable, the judges considered 
Hrybynyuk’s vulnerability because of the dangers inherent in the demolition work and his own 
inexperience. According to McHugh J in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180 at 228; (1999) 
Aust Torts Reports 81-516 <blockquote> 
Reliance and assumption of responsibility are merely indicators of the plaintiff’s vulnerability to harm from the 
defendant’s conduct, and it is the concept of vulnerability rather than these evidentiary indicators which is the 
relevant criterion for determining whether a duty of care exists.</blockquote> 
Although working bees were a regular feature of the club’s activities, the nature of this working bee was 
an atypical event with accompanying, unappreciated risks for an amateur such as Hrybynyuk. Since 
Mazur’s role in supervising the potentially hazardous demolition was, in the words of the trial judge, 
“outside the ordinary”19 interaction between club members, the Court of Appeal also determined that he 
owed a duty of care to Hrybynyuk. 
Members’ liability for volunteers 
Another question that arose for consideration was whether Mazur, in directing the demolition work, 
owed a duty of care to Hrybynyuk despite the fact that Hrybynyuk had volunteered to assist. Being a 
volunteer usually involves receiving no remuneration for the services rendered, apart from the 
reimbursement of any reasonable expenses incurred. The case of Hehir v Harvie & Duffield [1949] 
SASR 77 canvassed the question of whether acting voluntarily altered the traditional approach to 
negligence issues. 
 A passenger was injured after he volunteered to assist with changing a punctured car tyre. 
Subsequently, he launched negligence actions against both the driver of the stationary car and the driver 
of the moving vehicle that hit him. Mayo J in the Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court 
characterised the relationship between the driver of the immobile car and the passenger as that of 
invitor/invitee on the strict premise that the invitee must not be viewed as a volunteer. Although the 
primary responsibility for the passenger’s safety fell upon himself, he nevertheless had the right to 
expect the driver in his role of invitor to exercise reasonable care to warn him of unusual dangers. In the 
judge’s opinion, once the passenger began jacking up the car: <blockquote> 
He relinquished his own protection, depending on the driver who was bound to exercise a care commensurate with 
the plaintiff’s vulnerable predicament. Within the scope of the invitation, he had suspended his own look out in 
dependence upon the vigilance of the invitor.20</blockquote> 
 Ligertwood J analysed the facts on the basis of the duty of care as laid down in Donoghue v 
Stevenson [1932] AC 562. To him, the driver’s duty of care did not cease after the passenger voluntarily 
became involved in changing the tyre of the vehicle. “In assisting to change the wheel, the plaintiff was 
the driver’s ‘neighbour’ because he was engaged on his business.”21 The fact that the passenger was a 
volunteer was incidental to the outcome. Abbott J agreed with both judgments. 
 Commenting on these judgments, the Court of Appeal in Hrybynyuk v Mazur (at [24]) stated that 
similar considerations applied and that<blockquote> 
If there is a duty of care, it is a duty that arises on the ordinary principles of negligence. The factors relevant to 
liability were common and co-extensive regardless of whether the case is considered under a construct of a duty 
owed by Mr Mazur as a committee member or a duty owed to Mr Hrybynyuk as a volunteer. On either basis, a duty 
of care was owed.22</blockquote> 
 
18 Harrison v West of Scotland Kart Club [2000] ScotCS 284 at [3]. 
19 Hrybynyuk v Mazur [2004] NSWCA 374 at [18]. 
20 Hehir v Harvie & Duffield [1949] SASR 77 at 84. 
21 Hehir v Harvie & Duffield [1949] SASR 77 at 87. 
22 Hrybynyuk v Mazur [2004] NSWCA 374 at [24]. 
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 It is worth noting that an opposing viewpoint emerged in the Scottish case mentioned earlier 
concerning volunteer involvement in the replacement of a roof for the unincorporated Douglas Amateur 
Football Club Social Club.23 John Thomson, a member of the club, undertook to install a new roof at the 
club’s premises as an independent contractor assisted by four volunteers. Acting on his own initiative, 
Leonard Wallace, a fellow club member and one of the volunteers, was responsible for a number of roof 
trusses collapsing on top of Thomson. As a result of the severe spinal injuries he suffered, Thomson was 
never able to work again. Sheriff Davidson remarked, when considering whether instructions relating to 
roof safety should have been given:<blockquote> 
I am not prepared to hold in the particular circumstances of this case where the men were, in effect, volunteers that 
there was any particular duty incumbent upon Mr Thomson so to instruct them.24</blockquote> 
Therefore, no finding of contributory negligence on his behalf could be made. 
 Recent tort law statutory reforms in all Australian jurisdictions have given limited immunity to 
volunteers (including volunteer officers) being sued by third parties.25 However, the severe limitations 
of the immunity in many jurisdictions, such as not applying to volunteers of unincorporated bodies 
leaves ample room for the common law to apply in many situations. 
Conclusion  
Although the case of Hrybynyuk v Mazur [2004] NSWCA 374 singled out volunteers as an especially at 
risk group to whom a duty of care was owed, the main thrust of the judgment reaffirmed the accepted 
guidelines for determining liability in negligence when dealing with unincorporated associations. No 
duty of care arises merely because people share common membership of an unincorporated association. 
However, the position of committee members and office bearers in an unincorporated association is not 
quite so clear-cut. Australian authority26 plainly implies that committee members are liable in 
negligence, but English authority27 indicates that office-bearers, simply by virtue of their roles, do not 
attract any additional liability in negligence beyond that imposed under the common law. For additional 
liability to attach, the office-bearer must be involved in shouldering added responsibility with its 
attendant risks. This line of argument is followed in Hrybynyuk v Mazur at [19]-[21] where the joint 
judgment emphasised that recruiting a volunteer, such as Hrybynyuk, to perform dangerous demolition 
work fixed Mazur with a duty of care toward him “out of the ordinary” role as president. Alternatively, 
Hrybynyuk’s status as a volunteer was viewed as an equally valid means of establishing a duty of care 
on Mazur’s part. Similar considerations were held to apply whichever approach was taken. 
 In an ironic postscript, despite determining that a duty of care was owed towards Hrybynyuk 
whichever mode of attack was adopted, the New South Wales Court of Appeal failed to find that a 
breach of that duty had occurred. The chief reason cited for its decision was the paucity of the evidence 
presented to support Hrybynyuk’s claims that a building inspection should have been undertaken and a 
qualified person employed to oversee the demolition. Sievers, remarking on an unincorporated 
association’s liability in tort, addressed this particular issue:<blockquote> 
When a member is injured on the premises of a club or other association or in the course of activities organised by 
it, unless the evidence shows that the committee or some other individual can be held responsible, it appears that it 
will be difficult for her or him to succeed in an action for damages against the association.28</blockquote> 
 Nevertheless, unincorporated associations, such as the Russian Club, ever mindful of their 
precarious legal standing and their tortious liability, should consider ensuring that their risk management 
practices, including volunteer protection insurance, are comprehensive and current. Insurance which 
covers a volunteer for the event of injury in the course of volunteering is being proposed as “best 
practise” in Australia.29
 
23 Thomson v Douglas Amateur Football Club Social Club [1999] ScotsSC 19.  
24 Thomson v Douglas Amateur Football Club Social Club [1999] ScotsSC 19 at 25.  
25 McGregor-Lowndes M, “Volunteer Protection in Queensland” (2003) 24(2) Qld Lawyer 81 at 81-94. 
26 Smith v Yarnold [1969] 2 NSWR 410; City of Gosnells v Roberts (1994) 12 WAR 437. 
27 Harrison v West of Scotland Kart Club [2000] ScotCS 284; Robertson v Ridley [1989] 1 WLR 872; [1989] 2 All ER 474; (1989) 
133 SJ 1170. 
28 Sievers AS, n 11, p 38.  
29 Volunteering Australia Inc Model Code of Practice for Organisations Involving Volunteer Staff, 
http://www.volunteeringaustralia.org/html/so2_article/article_viewasp?id==2618nav_cat_id=1648nau_top-id=61fdsa=2582 {AQ-
url not workinghttp://www.volunteeringaustralia.org/files/7GHOWN9C10/VA%20Model%20Code%20June%202005.pdf}viewed 
10 April 200727 October 2006. 
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